

Modeling International Police Missions

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Preface

Nation Building is the process of establishing national identity by the power of the state (Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, 1966). This would include creating a national flag, language, stadiums, and airlines. These are often efforts “to redefine the populace of territories that had been carved out by colonial powers or empires without regard to ethnic, religious, or other boundaries” (Deutsch). The attempt is to bring solidarity to a people that don’t always have a great deal in common.

State Building, on the other hand, is the process of increasing capacity of government to govern. Three dimensions are normally attributed to this building activity: security; political; and economic (Persson, 2012). Though Nation Building and State Building are often used interchangeably, they are distinct activities.

International Police Missions target justice reform (the security dimension), and are only one part of the larger effort at State Building. These Missions focus on increasing the sustainable capacity of a host nation to police the population under the constraints of representative policing. However, though they are only one part of the State Building scheme, security and justice reforms are critical in the overall State Building effort. Citizens must feel both safe and not disenfranchised in order for them to support governance.

The road to successful Police Missions is one strewn with many potholes. Most venues are emerging from conflict (external and/or internal). Conflict and governmental instability intrinsically lead to corruption and lawlessness. Social and community infrastructure may have been unattended. This environment typically will also be one in which educating the population has been minimized by the previous regime. The result is often an unskilled workforce unconcerned of what future is possible, and relying of corruption and crime for influence and survival.

The Debate

Pundits debate the effectiveness and worthiness of Nation (State) Building activity. The issue is not whether State Building **can** work-for it seems the theoretical work is sound. Rather the question is whether the theory has been followed to allow for successful completion of the task. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (USRISD) identified three strategies for effective State Building: Good Governance; New Public Management; and Decentralization (UNRISD, 2010).

To say that the international community failed in State Building activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is, perhaps, an unfair assessment. While, without question, the goals of the Mission were not achieved as desired it would be unfair to assume that Iraq and Afghanistan did not benefit to some degree from the work that was accomplished.

The debate unfolding should not center on whether State Building **can** work. Rather the focus should be on identifying **why** recent attempts differed in results from past endeavors. Politically this is dangerous. Decision makers are exonerated if the discussion is allowed to focus on **can** it work, yet held accountable if the discussion is on **why** it did not work.

U.S. Government studies (cited later in this text) identify several glaring defects in State Building attempts post 9/11, yet few discussions have been held on changing the strategy deployed. The political conclusion is that State Building does not work. The more correct conclusion is that it was done wrong. In most organizations if a strategic plan fails the plan is revised to ensure meeting the original goal. In government if a plan fails the goal is deemed unworthy and without solution (for to do otherwise exposes civil servants to questions of competency).

The Landscape

Three important constraints are noted in recent State Building efforts:

1. Recent State Building efforts have centered on locations emerging from authoritarian regime changes
2. Recent State Building efforts have entered on populations that were technologically and socially archaic
3. Recent State Building efforts have centered on populations that relied more on tribal construct than governmental construct

As to the first constraint, recent State Building activity often has centered on countries where regime change had occurred. The previous regime was authoritarian. Though cause and effect are not proffered here, note that one constant theme in recent efforts has been the amount of corruption that emerged from the regime change. Unsurpassed levels of corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan, fueled by tremendous amount of cash being infused into the local economy by international partners, clearly helped derail opportunities and efforts to gain popular support of the government by local populace. Confusion during and after regime change, especially when moving from authoritarian rule to more representative government, leads to “every man for himself” mentality and the will to survive. If corruption is not aggressively curtailed from the outset the populace will find supporting the new government difficult as there is no underlying trust in the system of governance. The efforts are made more difficult in that the regime was replaced with centralized power structures (though USRISD recommends decentralization efforts).

In terms of reconstruction efforts, the difference between World War Two reconstruction and recent reconstruction efforts could not be more distinct. Both Japan and Germany had technology. The reconstruction was limited to rebuilding the infrastructure needed to use the technology. Recent State Building attempts, though, were in countries that lacked modern technology (and education). Creating modern infrastructure is wasted if there is not the knowledge of technology to use the infrastructure properly.

Reconstruction requires cooperation from the Host Country. That level of cooperation has to transcend “allowing” reconstruction. True cooperation must include not only reconstituting infrastructure but transforming cultural norms. This does not mean a Host Country must surrender its cultural heritage or religious norms. It does mean that norms need to be transformed and aligned with modern thought.

This leads to the third constraint. In some countries “honor killings” are seen as acceptable. Should a young female disgrace the family it is the family that executes the punishment (and the girl) rather than the government. This practice has historical roots in feudal and tribal cultures. However, modern governments are neither feudal nor tribal. A Host Country must be willing to transform from the feudal and tribal culture or efforts to State Build will fail.

The Afghanistan experience serves as a prime example. Nested in mountains and lacking functioning transportation infrastructure, a high percentage of Afghans lives outside the reach of the central government located in Kabul. Afghans relied more on the influence of tribal elders than on the government of Kabul. This creates what the West refers to as corruption, but what is referred to as “wasta” (nepotism, 'clout' or 'who you know') in Afghanistan. How much money you have, or your social status, determines what you are able to accomplish. Without a strong commitment to transform (a commitment shared by leaders and the population) the effort is doomed to fail.

Central Issues

The Policing Model

Recent International Police Missions have allowed the host country to merge security with criminal justice reforms. In fact, they are different concerns.

Security relates to national security interests and involves building up centralized (nationwide) capacity to protect borders and international interests via a military. Security relates to external threats.

Criminal justice reforms, though, center on enforcing criminal laws on internal threats. This distinction is important. In representative policing the authority to police is granted by the population being policed. No such consent need be granted to military operators as the operators deal with external populations rather than internal populations. Military operators answer to the government. Police operators answer to the Courts, the Prosecutors and to the population.

The involvement of military components in executing the Nation Building model must be well thought out. U.S. and NATO military were heavily involved in both Iraq and Afghanistan (and in Palestine) Missions. While the military can provide tremendous assistance to the effort, the obvious danger is that police contingents will look (and perform) more like a military component than a police component. Representative policing looks nothing like military (even Military Police) operations.

“Militarization of the police will produce a force that is inconsistent with the country’s long-term needs. Assigning responsibility for training Iraq’s police to the U.S. military produced a highly militarized force with little ability to enforce the rule of law. Setting aside the IFP, which was designed as a paramilitary force, providing military-style training to the IPS created a force of some 400,000 personnel that was inconsistent with Iraq’s post conflict requirements.” (Perito, October 2011)

The Jurisdiction

Military units generally are national organizations. Police forces can be either local forces or a part of a national police force. In the United States the federal law enforcement capabilities are far reduced. There is no federal police force. Rather, there are federal organizations that have police powers with respect to certain crimes (referred to as Title Authority). Federal organizations are only allowed to enforce certain Federal laws. Even State Police forces pale in comparison to local (city and country) forces in terms of personnel assigned. Policing is done on the community level, not the national level. Some European countries do deploy national police forces.

Most recent attempts in International Police Missions have involved centralized national police forces (Iraqi National Police, Afghan National Police, and Palestinian Authority Security Forces). Though the intent was to focus the forces on community policing, the very tenant of community policing (police where you live) is violated. Personnel may live in one geographic location but are assigned to police an area hundreds of miles away.

The Organizational Structure

Worldwide, police organizations are normally referred to as para-military organizations. This is in part because the command structure (rank) loosely mirrors a military organization. Militaries, though, are established, and deploy, in squads, platoons, companies and divisions. Law enforcement organizations mostly deploy individual officers (sometimes in pairs) and the officers are tasked with patrolling (or guarding) a limited geographic area (a territory). Territories are often grouped into zones, and zones are led by Sergeants.

This brings to bear another interesting dilemma. Most modern police forces work employees in shifts (8-12 hours). Employees work their shift then return home. Recent International Police Missions, though, have allowed police forces to adopt the military model where employees are assigned to a location and live at that location for long periods of time (one week to one month). This, then, requires the organization to billet (house and feed) the employees. This occurs because, as noted previously, the

officers may work hundreds of miles away from where they live. Accordingly, the cost of police operations is dramatically increased.

The Recruiting

U.S. and European law enforcement are centered on professional police forces. Part of being professional police has been the focus of law enforcement as a career. The most recent examples of International Police Missions, though, have centered on conscripts-personnel who sign up for a determined length of service in the police. Recent examples are not people of choose law enforcement as a career, rather people sign up for a limited commitment.

This creates challenges. Professional law enforcement relies on having to fully vet and train officers one time. Though in-service and specialized or advanced training continue throughout an officer's career, the lengthy and costly basic training is only done once. Employee turn-over is minimized and allows for more cost-effective policing (not constantly having to train significant numbers of new personnel).

To the contrary, though, a system that is staffed with conscripts is one in which the bulk of the workforce is completely turned over every four to six years. This creates a requirement that lengthy and costly training must be an ongoing cycle. Further, personnel who have gained experience and professionalism are constantly rotated out, leaving inexperienced personnel to replace them.

The Training

Law enforcement training should increase the capacity of individual officers. Military training, on the other hand, uses Basic Training to increase capacity of individual officers, but training is then shifted towards squad and platoon training. While law enforcement Basic Training prepares the individual officer for all tasks they will encounter on patrol, the military Basic Training centers on how to march and how to shoot-leaving the other job specific training to occur later in Squad, Platoon and Company training (MOS).

Surprisingly, there are no codified International Standards for law enforcement, nor is there a definitive set of Lesson Plans for training police in post conflict countries. While the Mission in Iraq and Afghanistan had the same central themes, the training provided and the standards of performance sought were vastly different. Additionally, the approaches to the Missions by the United States Department of State and Department of Defense were vastly different as well.

All Police Missions should follow one model. Representative policing is representative policing. Though the process, policies and problems encountered may differ from country to country, the basic tenants of representative policing should be the same. As well, the training should be the same.

The Attitude

U.S. and European police forces wear uniforms that provide a visual distinction between police and military. In more recent attempts at Nation Building police have been provided uniforms that appear more military than conventional police. When combined with exact rank designations, organizational

structure and military training is it any wonder that many of recent Nation Building attempts have failed to produce representative police units?

“Unfortunately, the transfer of responsibility from State to DOD and the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty were not accompanied by a meeting of the minds among CPATT, State and Justice along with their contract advisers, the U.S. military battle space commanders, and the Iraqis... The U.S. military concluded that the security situation required the creation of a militarized counterinsurgency police force, and that community-based policing would have to wait...The State Department and DOJ police advisers believed the U.S. military did not understand the ethos or the practical requirements for training law enforcement officers and was intent on simply putting Iraqi guns on the street to reduce pressure on coalition forces. DOJ civilian police advisers changed the name of the organization from the Saddam-era Iraqi National Police to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to emphasize what they believed should be the new police personnel’s community service orientation” (Perito, October 2011).

The Metrics

In modern business, strategic plans are built that examine and define organizational goals and objectives. The strategy is crafted to drive initiatives that produce certain results. **Strategic planning** is a process of defining strategy, or direction, and making decisions on allocating available resources to pursue the strategy (Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996).

Performance metrics are identified to track the effectiveness of the strategy. **Performance measurement** is the process of collecting, analyzing and/or reporting information regarding performance. It can involve studying processes/strategies within organizations to see whether output are in line with what was intended or should have been achieved (Upadhaya, 2014).

The United States Department of State has, many times, failed to build a functioning strategic plan in State Building activities. Often efforts at State Building are ad hoc and few, if any, metrics are imposed (Action, 2016).

State Building is a Mission with certain objectives. All of the objectives center on creating change within the host nation (e.g. Increase sustainable capacity of law enforcement). The argument, and prime thesis of this text, is that there must be a correlation between the Mission Objective and the Metrics for the strategic plan to be properly modeled, executed and completed. The temptation is to measure outputs of the international coalition (e.g. police mentors did “x”), but this creates disconnect. In Afghanistan, for example, one metric identified by NATO was to train 150,000 Afghan security forces. The coalition succeeded in meeting that metric, but the metric was meaningless. The fact that 150,000 were trained meant only that Afghan security personnel knew how to march in formation and execute base military maneuvers. There was no method of measuring indigenous output (were the security forces competent to perform their job). If the Mission Objective is to increase capacity of indigenous forces then the measure must be an output of indigenous capacity (not an output of coalition forces efforts).

Interestingly, efforts at Iraq Reconstruction were examined in a government report. The report detailed seven lessons from the Iraq effort (Reconstruction, 2013). Those lessons were:

1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO)
2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on small programs and projects
3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer
4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all SRO participants use
5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation's inception
6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander's Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team program that produced successes when used judiciously
7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go

Despite the detailed report, efforts in other Missions were not realigned to comply with the lessons learned, and those efforts continue to struggle for success.

Solutions

1. Build consensus, both within the United States and other foreign actors, on development of a strong strategic plan for State Building that relies on previous research and theories
 - a. Ongoing disputes between the Department of State and Department of Defense must be resolved
 - b. Codified International Police Standards must be developed
 - i. Identify Core Standards
 1. Human Rights standards
 2. Use of Force standards
 3. Training standards
 4. Internal Affairs standards
 - ii. Identify Organizational Standards
 1. Administrative best practices
 2. Operations best practices
 3. Support best practices
 - c. Codified Mission Objectives and Performance Measures should be adopted
 - i. Include Objectives related to police Administration
 1. Leadership

2. Human Resources
 3. Finance
 4. Recruiting
 - ii. Include Objectives related to Police Operations
 1. Patrol
 2. Traffic
 3. Investigations
 4. Intelligence
 - iii. Include Objectives related to Police Support
 1. Communications
 2. Property Room
 3. Training
2. Identify or create training Lesson Plans that can be implemented that train police forces in appropriate competencies (Administration, Operations and Support)
3. Establish a mechanism enabling measurement of host country law enforcement performance in areas of competencies (Administration, Operations and Support)
 - a. Identify why competencies are not being met
 - i. Lack of resources
 - ii. Lack of knowledge
 - iii. Lack of commitment or supervision
 - b. Identify clear lanes of communication allowing mentors to react/resolve why competencies are not being met
4. Establish clear lanes of program execution between military and civilian actors
 - a. Use military assets and processes where appropriate (military training)
 - b. Use police advisors to establish representative policing (police training)
5. Train international police advisors more intensely on how to mentor effectively
 - a. How to collaborate
 - b. How to encourage
 - c. How to affect change
6. Develop stringent protocol on international oversight into host country corruption
 - a. Allow for international investigation of corruption
 - b. Allow for international prosecution of corruption
7. For State Building to succeed requires total agreement from the Host Country that they concur with the efforts. As well, international actors must be prepared for long scale operations, as changing social, cultural and political paradigms is generational

Conclusion

State Building can be effectively executed and beneficial to building a stable world environment. However, inappropriate execution models will lead, and have led, to failed initiatives. Effective State

Building should draw on the business model of strategic planning, and proper Performance Measures will ensure success of the Mission.

Though historically efforts have relied on military actors to conduct rebuilding efforts (based upon their organization and logistical capacity), reliance on the military very often leads to ineffective results. As previously noted, there is a difference between military and police operations, and long term effectiveness is often thwarted by short term military intent (Perito, October 2011).

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